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Although it has become extremely common for scientists to make
use of sophisticated instruments in combination with computational
treatments of data in their observational practices, only the former
has caused a debate among philosophers. Whether it is appropriate
to make use of such instruments as telescopes, microscopes, PET
scans, MRI devices and so forth is a question that has received var-
ious answers, depending on how the concept of observation is to be
understood. The classical empiricist view, that sees unaided percep-
tion as the only way that human beings can really learn about facts
of the world, has notably been followed by van Fraassen [1] while
many other philosophers have defended the idea that instruments
can legitimately be used in observation, so long as the processes in-
volved in data acquisition meet some requirements. Hence, Maxwell
[2], Shapere [3], Hacking [4] and others have opposed not only to
the observational/theoretical distinction that shapes the empiricist
view, most strikingly in its logical form, but also to the observ-
able/unobservable distinction. Indeed, to defend that instruments
play a role in observation is to acknowledge that what is observable
at a given time is a function of our technology and therefore, that
no fixed distinction can be established in the long term regarding
what is observable and what is not.
Among the defenders of a concept of observation that is not ex-
clusively associated to human perception, it is unfortunate that none
has tried to propose a systematic account of the different ways that
the data acquired with an instrument are processed before they are
actually used to observe some entity or phenomenon. Their analysis
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remains of great value, especially in the realism/empiricism debate,
as well as in some simpler situations, but it often proves inapplicable
when trying to evaluate observation claims made by scientists. Ex-
amples of such claims include astronomical images, for which data
have been processed to correct for a known defect of the telescope,
or medical images, the great success of which relies on their offering
a three-dimensional view of body structures. In the latter case, 3D
images can only be produced from what is actually recorded by in-
struments through mathematical algorithms, which transform a set
of 2D radiography-like projection images into a 3D volume. Other
treatments aim to facilitate data interpretation, by detecting rele-
vant objects in an intricate image for example. Those are commonly
used by scientists as datasets tend to be larger and larger. It will
be our goal in this paper to present the different kinds of data pro-
cessing and to evaluate their compatibility with the desiderata of
observation.
A minimal notion of observation
In this undertaking, however, it is a most unwelcomed fact that no
agreement has been reached concerning what observation is in the
first place. From the impossibility concluded by the works of the
Vienna Circles members to concile truth and objectivity of observa-
tion sentences (see Carnap [5], Neurath [6], Schlick [7]), not much
can positively be said, except that we cannot renounce objectivity,
since it alone permits to enforce the condition of communicability.
As Daston and Galison [8] put it, “if even godlike knowledge of the
nature of things fail[s] the test of communicability, it [cannot] be
science.” In contrast, the truth desiderata of observation sentences
is left open and we can either follow Feyerabend [9], positing that
observation statements are characterized by mere widespread de-
cidability, or add some milder truth requirements, for example that
observation statements should at least be more likely to be true than
other statements.
Now, since it is not the place here for debating at length over this
and other problems linked to the proper definition of observation,
(its association to human perception only, its appropriate language
and the forth), we need to find a way to escape these difficulties.
To this end, I will formulate the problem discussed in the rest of
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paper as follows: if we assume that one observes some entity or
some phenomenon by making use of an instrument that produces
raw data, that is, data recorded by the instrument, with no post-
processing, what are the typical mathematical treatments that are
used by scientists to transform the raw data? And are some of those
treatments compatible with observation? Can one still claim to
(supposedly better) observe from the processed data the same entity
or phenomenon that was already claimed to be observed (supposedly
not as clearly) from the raw data?
Asking this question implies that we work with a fuzzy concept
of observation, that adapts to one’s preferences regarding the prob-
lems raised by this very concept. Relativizing the concept will prove
quite uninteresting in some cases. The strong perception-centered
empiricist thesis, that only accepts sense-data as permitting to ob-
serve, will result in no positive cases of observation from the raw
data, so long as an instrument has been used, and therefore no pos-
sibility for one to observe from the processed data either. So even
if the present work will not conflict with this view, the problem
that we raise is simply not interesting for its advocates. However,
for the philosophers who are sympathetic to the positions expressed
by Maxwell, Shapere or Hacking, our work can be thought of as a
plug-in to their views, that aims to make their positions applicable
in many more situations than in their present state.
We could not go very far however, without giving at least some
conditions for an experience to count as observational. If we were
to accept that any sort of data can serve in observation, we would
reach our conclusions very quickly and any type of data process-
ing, applied to any data could serve in observation. Therefore, we
need to give at least a minimal notion of what observation is, that
will give us some constraints concerning what is and what is not
acceptable in practice. In the rest of the paper, observation will
be understood as follows: to observe is to give an interpretation of
some data in terms of a real entity or phenomenon. We talk about
observing, rather than interpreting, when we can only come up with
one interpretation, shared by any qualified observer, which is nei-
ther ambiguous, nor dubious. In particular, this interpretation must
be independant from the various theoretical views that different ob-
servers can endorse, to at least enforce the objectivity of observa-
tion. This is where, it seems, there is a general agreement among
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philosophers, as we have previously noticed. When data meet these
requirements and can be used to observe something, I will say that
they are “observational”. So if the raw data can be used for the ob-
servation of some phenomenon (i.e. are observational), can we still
interpret the processed data without contaminating the observation
with inferences, theories or beliefs? Are some kinds of processed
data observational as well?
Raw data are not pure data
In our formulation of the problem, we contrast the raw data with
the processed data. By “processed data”, we mean the data that the
scientists actually use to observe something, and that are created
from the raw data, by use of some mathematical transformation.
The distinction that I have in mind here, is that between what has
been recorded by the instrument (a measurement or a spatially or
temporally organized set of measurements) and post-processed data,
that is, a new set of numbers computed from the previous one. A
very basic example would be to take someones temperature with
a thermometer. The number that reads on the instrument is the
raw datum, just one measurement. Now if we read carefully the
instructions to use the instrument properly, we might find indica-
tions to apply corrections, according to the various ways to take the
temperature. For example, if the thermometer was introduced in
the patients mouth, one might have to add 0.5◦C to the raw datum
because the oral temperature is known to underestimate the central
temperature by approximately this margin. Of course, we could
already claim to observe the patients temperature from the raw da-
tum, but we should better claim that we observe the temperature
of his mouth in this case, the local temperature. The correction
suggested by the instructions is aimed to better approximate the
central temperature of the body.
But this example shows that the notion of raw data is not very
clear. We can take it to be what is given to us by the instrument,
the most basic, least processed data that is available to the observer.
If one used a little bit more sophisticated thermometer, that adds
0.5◦C when we press a button corresponding to the oral tempera-
ture, we would have both the raw datum and the processed datum.
But if one knows from the beginning that we will always use the
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thermometer in the same way, he can buy one that just displays
the corrected temperature and nothing else. Since there is no other
data available, this is the raw datum.
We could of course say that even when the unprocessed data are
not accessible to the observer, because they have not been recorded,
they still exist and have been used to compute some processed data,
but it seems unnecessary to argue so. Among scientists, the meaning
of “raw data” seems to roughly correspond to what we suggested,
namely, the least processed data available. We should therefore aban-
don the idea that the raw data be “pure” in any sense of the term.
So the distinction of interest here, is not between “pure” (raw) data
and “contaminated” (processed) data, but rather between two sets
of data, which are both very likely to be processed in some way,
but for which one set of data has been created from the other, by
applying an extra mathematical transformation.
The methodology of this paper might then seem puzzling. If we
can demonstrate that some processed data are observational because
they have been computed from observational raw data with a math-
ematical treatment that is compatible with observation, the whole
reasoning then relies on the assumption that the raw data are obser-
vational in the first place. But this appears to be wishful thinking,
since the raw data are not even supposed to be free of mathematical
processing. So our analysis only applies to a relative difference of
mathematical treatment loading between two datasets. As such, it
provides a basis for a justification of the observational status of data
by recurrence. The question that we are addressing has the form
of a recurrence hypothesis: if we assume that a dataset is observa-
tional and has has been processed n times, how can we guarantee
that the dataset of rank (n+ 1), that has been processed one more
time, is observational? If we can find the conditions for this to hap-
pend, then we will just have to assume that some rank of dataset is
observational. It is in this sense that this work can be interpreted
as a plug-in to the various justifications that have been given by
philosophers, that the data acquired with such or such instrument
are observational. They provide a justification for the observational
status of some rank of data. Let us now take a basic look at how
data processing is achieved and its link to simulations.
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Data processing and simulations
Computers play a fundamental role in todays practices of observa-
tion. It is because most instruments are linked to computer systems
that much of the data recorded by instruments have a digital form
(a list of numbers). This means that any image that is displayed on
a computer screen is actually coded as an array of numbers1, that
can easily be considered as a matrix or a vector. If we call d the
vector of raw data, the processed data p are obtained by applying
some transform T to d according to the equation:
p = Td (1)
The operator T is based on a mathematical model that aims to
describe something that is relevant to the scientists task. More
specifically, the model relies on assumptions which can be associated
with three different levels: the object of investigation (that that is
being observed), the acquisition of data and the perception of data
by an observer. But before we go further into this distinction, it is
worth noticing the similarity between data processing and computer
simulations. According to Hartmann [10], “simulations are closely
related to dynamic models. More concretely, a simulation results
when the equations of the underlying model are solved.” How then
is data processing different from simulations? They are not entirely
different, since they cover a number of identical situations, but they
can be contrasted by several aspects. First, while it is a requirement
for simulations to make use of dynamical models, that is, models
that essentially describe a dynamical process, one makes use of any
sorts of models (dynamic or static) in data processing. Second, in
simulations, one investigates a given phenomenon, and the model
is a model of this phenomenon. This is not necessarily the case in
data processing, since, as we have already stated, the model can
either deal with the investigated phenomenon, or with the processes
of data acquisition or of human perception of the data. So from
these two aspects, simulations appear like a restricted case of data
processing. But there is a third aspect that needs to be stressed,
1A distinction must be made here between the data that are recorded by an instrument,
stored as list of numbers and the displayed data, which are often presented as an image, created
from the list of numbers. Several parameters are involved in the transformation of a list of
numbers into an image: the colours associated to each number, a scale factor, possibly some
rotation parameter to define the most natural orientation, etc. Other types of data display
are graphs or the list of number itself.
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namely, that any type of data can be put in the dynamic equation
of simulations to serve as initial conditions. In data processing, the
data we are talking about are characterized by a real connection to
their object, they are necessary indicial in Peirce’s sense. So while in
simulations, we could see how an imaginary population evolves and
spreads out on an imaginary planet, data processing is characterized
by the use of data that refer to the actual world in a causal way.
Therefore, from this third aspect, data processing is a restricted case
of simulations.
The fact that non-observational data often serve as initial con-
ditions in simulations is, I believe, essential to the understanding
of why, in spite of the interest that simulations have raised among
philosophers in the past decade, not much has been said about the
observational status of simulations. For there is another general
agreement about observation, namely that any observational data
must somehow relate, more or less directly, to the real world, and
not be entirely computed. In other words, the nature of observa-
tional data must be, at least partly, indicial. Hence, the questions
raised in the literature dedicated to simulations have dealt with the
experimental status of simulations, but not with their observational
status. I argue however that it makes sense to study the observa-
tional status of processed data, because, although these data can
sometimes be seen as the result of simulations, it is a special case of
simulations, in which indicial data are plugged into the equation (we
have actually assumed that the data d of equation (1) are not only
indicial, but even observational). We will now turn to the three dif-
ferent situations that we have identified for data processing, starting
with models that describe the object that is investigated.
Models of the observed phenomenon
From the previous remarks, we deduce that this case is the only one
in which data processing can also be considered as simulations, but
only so long as the underlying model of equation (1) is dynamic. It
is therefore natural for us to explore both dynamic and static models
of the observed phenomenon separately.
Data that have been processed with a dynamic model of the
observed phenomenon are not good candidates to count as obser-
vational. The dynamic aspect results in these data serving essen-
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tially for predictions, as in the case of eclipses, weather forecast
or continental drift for example. Each of these examples has the
same structure: we record some data that qualify as observational
(planet and sun positions and velocity; temperature, pressure and
clouds position; landmasses position), we then apply mathematical
transforms to these data, that are based respectively on Newtons
dynamic laws in the first example and a highly complex mixture of
empirical and statistical models in the second and third examples.
But even the data obtained by applying a deterministic law cannot
qualify as observable, for we could never say, when looking at the
result of a simulation that shows a solar eclipse that will take place
in decades, that we are “observing” this eclipse. This is also true
for phenomena that took place in the past; it would sound equally
awkward and wrong to say that we are observing an eclipse that sup-
posedly took place several centuries ago and that was not recorded
by any means, just from looking at simulated data, even if these
were created by transformation of real data.
Data processed with a transform based on a static model have
much better potential with respect to observation. If we get back
to the temperature of the human body, as measured with a ther-
mometer, the fact that we process the datum by adding 0.5◦C to
what is given by the thermomter (the raw datum) does not seem
to work against the idea that we are still observing the body tem-
perature from the processed datum. This correction is based on an
empirical law that states that “the temperature in the mouth is (ap-
proximately) 0.5◦C lower than the central temperature”. Since this
law is widely accepted among observers, the processed data cannot
be said to be attached to some subjective content. It is statistical in
nature of course, because the correction would better be 0.4◦C for
some people and 0.6◦C for others, but the important thing is that
the correction always improve the observational status compared to
the raw data. From this example, I want to suggest that transform-
ing observational data with a static model based on a deterministic
law (theoretical or empirical) could be compatible with observation,
or at least with our working definition of observation. We are surely
making use of a piece of theory here, but if it is completely uncontro-
versial (to ensure objectivity), deterministic (to ensure some form
of certainty) and static (to avoid the possibility to observe what has
not yet happened), it seems to be in accordance with the scientific
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usage of the word “observation”.
Models of data acquisition
This type of data processing is aimed to improve the readability
of the raw data, by incorporating some knowledge about how they
were recorded and the factors that could contribute to some loss
of information. When scientists deal with blurry images, that have
been recorded with a microscope for example, post-processing can be
applied to correct for this effect. Like any recording device, micro-
scopes cannot record a signal with infinite precision. A compromise
has to be found between sensitivity and resolution, since one works
against the other. This phenomenon has long been described in the
field of signal processing: the resulting blurry image can be seen
as a perfectly detailed image, convolved with the response of the
detector. So instead of having a point of the object represented by
a single point in the image produced by the microscope, a point is
represented by a disk, the diameter of which is a characteristic of
the imaging device. The relationship that stands between the re-
sponse of the detector and the blurriness of the image is simple: the
larger the diameter of this response, the more blurry the resulting
image. If scientists have a model of (raw) data acquisition, they
can process these data with the inverse of the blur model. In our
case, since the raw data are convolved with some known function,
they can be deconvolved with the same function, in order to obtain
a sharper image, that shows microscopic features of the object with
much more details. So, again, although they can already claim to
observe the sample from the blurry image (the displayed raw data),
the resulting processed data permit to better observe the sample.
But can these processed data qualify as observational, even though
one has made use of assumptions in producing them? I believe so,
because if we are to consider that the blurry data are observational,
then we should ask ourselves how we would interpret them, and I
dont see that anyone would read them as sharp images of blurry en-
tities. If everyone interpret them correctly, that is, as blurry images
of sharp entities, it means that the knowledge that is incorporated in
the deconvolution is actually not new, since we already use it when
interpreting the raw data. So my view is that, in most cases, when
data processing relies on a model of data acquisition (describing the
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transmission of information or the instrument), we are just imple-
menting explicitly pieces of knowledge that we already use implicitly
when interpreting the raw data. This is why, I think, reconstruction
methods (data processing with a model of data acquisition, which in-
cludes deconvolution (“deblurring”) or tomographic reconstruction
for example) yield data that qualify as observational.
Models of perception
Data processing based on models of perception is currently leading
to many developments, with dozens of new papers being published
every month in many different journals. This is due to the fact that,
while reconstruction methods (data processing based on a model of
data acquisition) apply indistinctly to any object that the scientists
want to observe, since it is the same thing to deconvolve an image of
cells and an image of bacteria for example, data processing based on
models of perception adapts to every different problem. This type of
mathematical treatments, that we can call interpretive treatments,
is aimed to partly automatize the interpretation of the data, for ex-
ample by running an algorithm that detects relevant objects. This
is a set of very precious tools for scientists who deal with extremely
large datasets, whether they are physicians, looking for small breast
tumors in a stack of radiological images or astrophysicist, trying to
detect new stellar objects that could cover only a few pixels in giga-
bytes of data. But these methods are not only about detection. Very
often, the object of interest is very visible but scientists need to mea-
sure some of its geometric parameters (diameter, surface, volume, or
simply their shape) to classify it. The physician often knows that his
patient has a brain tumor, but he needs to check if it has increased
or decreased in size after some treatment. So he must draw the con-
tours of what he thinks is the tumor on an MRI scan, which is a very
tedious task on three-dimensional data. To accomplish this task, one
uses visual perception, detecting objects either by identifying their
edges, when the contrast between them and the background is high
and sharp, or by seeing them as relatively homogeneous areas char-
acterized by a specific color. Models of perception usually mimick
one of these two processes, or sometimes combine them for greater
robustness. When implemented within an algorithm, they permit
the observer to transform his imaging device - a property detector
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- into an entity detector. A CAT-scan device for instance, which
detects a specific physical property of matter - that of attenuating
X-rays - can be turned into a tumor detector, or a bone detector etc.
This not only saves a lot of time, it also generates agreement among
observers and permits to obtain reproductible results, which proves
impossible even when a single observer manually draws the contour
of an object several times. In addition, this type of data process-
ing relies on quite simple and universal models of perception, and
should therefore not contaminate the processed data with undesired
biases. Yet, I argue that such processed data are generally not ob-
servational and are not considered observational by scientists. The
reason is that, although their fundamental principle is to implement
universal models of perception, they are task-oriented and can there-
fore only perform well in normal situations, when everything turns
as expected. Parameters are set in order to detect a specific class of
objects, but these algorithms wont adapt to objects outside of this
class, as would the expert that really looks at the image. They are
widely used, however, but only in combination with the raw data,
so the expert can check that he would actually have seen the same
thing as the algorithm. But no one blindly accepts the results given
by interpretive treatments. No physician would prescribe surgery
because the algorithm, and the algorithm only, has found that the
tumor has increased in size since the last scan. This is to be con-
trasted with the previous type of data processing: scientists do not
necessarily look at the blurry image when they have the deconvolved
one. We see then that interpretive treatments are reminiscent of our
first type of data processing, that makes use of hypotheses concern-
ing what is being observed. We saw that such treatments could
be compatible with observation, provided that they enforce some
condition of objectivity and of certainty or high probability. This
is what interpretive treatments lack: because they are designed to
help the observer accomplish a very specific task, they do not adapt
well to unexpected situations and are prone to errors.
Conclusion
I have surveyed three types of data processing, characterized by the
domain of application of the underlying models, that aim to describe
respectively the object of investigation, processes of data acquisition
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and the perception of the data. My conclusions are roughly that
only reconstruction methods (data processing of the second type)
are widely accepted as observational. This means that the resulting
data can serve in observation as well as the raw data, if not bet-
ter. Among the other cases, that of simulations (data processing
of the first type that make use of a dynamic model) seems at odd
with even a very liberal notion of observation, because it essentially
serves to make predictions (or “retrodictions”) by making use of a
dynamic model. As for interpretive treatments (third type), they
need to be highly task-specific to perform well enough and be of
any use for scientists, but this make them highly fallible when deal-
ing with unexpected situations, too much indeed to be accepted in
observational practices. Finally, I suggested that data processing
based on static models of the observed object could be observa-
tional, but this requires further investigation, and probably a more
detailed analysis than that I was able to provide here. Besides, this
part of the analysis is perhaps the most sensitive to the concept of
observation that we endorse, so it might prove necessary to give a
much more precise definition of this concept before we can move
on this point. A final word concerning this paper: I have chosen
to limit my enquiry to data recorded by instruments and processed
with computers. Although it would have been too ambitious to do
so here, I am sure that extending the analysis to perception would
be extremely fruitful.
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